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NOTE
HILL V. COLORADO: THE SUPREME COURT'S
DEVIATION FROM TRADITIONAL FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE TO SILENCE THE
MESSAGE OF ABORTION PROTESTORS
Mark Villanueva'
The First Amendment' to the Constitution of the United States
provides protection for freedom of religion, assembly, press, and speech.2
Since the ratification of the First Amendment, the United States
Supreme Court has found that the rights contained in the First
Amendment are fundamental and deserve a higher level of scrutiny
when the government attempts to infringe on these rights.3 Freedom of
speech is a fundamental liberty;4 however, the Supreme Court has held
repeatedly that the right to free speech is not absolute.5 The Court has
*J.D. Candidate, May 2002, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Id. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
3. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In his
footnote Justice Stone stated that "[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." Id. The
footnote suggested three situations in which the Court should apply strict scrutiny: (1) if
"legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those in the first ten amendments"; (2) if legislation restricts those political processes
"which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," such
as impairments of the right to vote; and (3) if legislation is aimed at "discrete and insular
minorities" who are unable to protect themselves through the ordinary political processes
because of the prejudice against them. Id.
4. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). Justice Cardozo suggested
that "our history, political and legal," recognized "freedom of thought, and speech" as
"the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." Id. Therefore, he
characterized freedom of speech as a fundamental liberty. Id.
5. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (noting that "[t]he most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
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found that when the First Amendment's free speech protection is
asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers, it must weigh
the respective interests.'
Perhaps one of the most emotionally-charged contemporary free
speech issues arises when the Court balances the government's interest in
protecting the safety of patients and staff at abortion clinics against the
First Amendment right to free speech of abortion protestors! Although
women have been able to legally get an abortion for twenty-eight years,"
it has become increasingly difficult for them to obtain one. 9 Harassment,
blockades, vandalism, arson, and murder have become significant
barriers for women seeking abortions.01 While women must be given
legal protection so they can exercise their right to obtain an abortion, it
should be done without trampling on the First Amendment rights of
theatre and causing a panic"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
In Chaplinsky, the Court stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words - those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
ld.; see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (finding that "[t]he
demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as [countervailing governmental
interests] are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests,
within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for
the non-Euclidean problems to be solved"); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36,
49 (1961) (holding that "we reject the view that freedom of speech and association ... are
'absolutes'); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 283 (1964) (holding
that a statement about a public official is protected by the First Amendment except when
the statement is made with actual malice); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973)
(finding that obscene material falls outside of the First Amendment).
6. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 51 (finding that when "constitutional protections are
asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be
effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests
involved"); see also Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (defending the balancing test).
7. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); see also Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). In these two cases, the Court examined various
injunctions that restricted abortion protestors' rights to picket and speak outside of
abortion clinics. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757; Schenck, 519 U.S. at 362.
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 869 874-75 (1992) (reaffirming the constitutional protection for abortion, but
instituting a new "undue burden" test for evaluating abortion restrictions).
9. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 6
(describing the nationwide campaign to bar access to facilities that provide abortions).
10. See generally Stephen J. Hedges et al., Abortion: Who's Behind the Violence?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 1994, at 50 (discussing various acts of violence
committed against abortion clinics and doctors); Fay Clayton & Sara N. Love, NOW v.
Scheidler: Protecting Women's Access to Reproductive Health Services, 62 ALB. L.REV.
967,968-73 (1999) (examining the climate of terrorism in the early 1980s).
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abortion protestors."
The Supreme Court has dealt directly with restrictions on these
protestors, called sidewalk counselors, outside of abortion clinics on
three separate occasions.12 The first two cases dealt with court
injunctions,' 3 while the third and most recent case dealt with a statewide
statute.'4 Although these cases have factual differences, the Supreme
Court has consistently denied abortion protestors their full First
Amendment protections.
6
At issue in Hill v. Colorado1
was the constitutionality of a 1993
Colorado statute regulating speech-related conduct within one hundred
feet of the entrance to any health care facility. 7 The challenged section
of the statute makes it unlawful for any person within one hundred feet
of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach within eight
feet of another person, without that person's consent," in order to pass
"a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest,

education or counseling with [that] person

. . .,,

The crime of knowing

11. See generally Deborah A. Ellis & Yolanda S. Wu, Abortion Rights: Of Buffer
Zones and Broken Bones: BalancingAccess to Abortion and Anti-abortion Protestors'First
Amendment Rights in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 547, 547-49
(1996) (discussing courts' approaches to protecting the safety of patients and providers at
reproductive health care facilities without infringing on abortion protestors' free speech
rights); Lolita Youmans, Note, Operation Rescue v. Planned Parenthood,Inc.: A Judicial
Showdown Over Sidewalk Counselors and First Amendment Rights, 37 HOUs. L. REV.
603, 605-06 (2000) (examining whether the First Amendment guarantee of free speech
allows abortion protestors to approach women seeking abortion services).
12. See Hill v. Colorado 530 U.S. 703, 712-14 (2000) (upholding a state law banning
protestors' activities outside of medical facilities); Madsen 512 U.S. at 764-65 (finding that
the applicable test under the First Amendment for content-neutral, generally applicable
statutes was not sufficient to protect First Amendment rights curtailed by an injunction
issued by a court); Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377-81 (affirming in part and striking in part an
injunction that created both floating bubble zones and fixed bubble zones).
13. Both the Madsen and Schenck decisions examined the constitutionality of court
issued injunctions. As discussed below, injunctions receive a different level of scrutiny
than statutes. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
14. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 707-08; see also infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
15. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson
From the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 936 (1999) (suggesting that abortion
protestors are experiencing the same type of censorship that slavery abolitionists
experienced before the Civil War).
16. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
17. Id. at 707. The statute at issue was Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 (1999).
18. Hill, 530 U.S. at 707 (citation omitted). Section 18-9-122 reads as follows:
(1) The general assembly recognizes that access to health care facilities for
the purpose of obtaining medical counseling and treatment is imperative for the
citizens of this state; that the exercise of a person's right to protest or counsel
against certain medical procedures must be balanced against another person's
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obstruction is a class three misdemeanor, punishable by a minimum fine
of fifty dollars and a maximum fine of seven hundred and fifty dollars, up
to six months imprisonment, or a combination of both.19
The Supreme Court found the statute consistent with the First
Amendment. 0 The Court concluded that the statute was a contentneutral, valid time, place, and manner restriction on speech."
Furthermore, the Court held that the statute was neither
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, nor a prior restraint on speech.22
This Note examines the interplay between a woman's right to enter a
healthcare facility to obtain an abortion and a speaker's right to "protest,
educate, or counsel" outside these facilities. This Note first discusses the
evolution of the First Amendment right to free speech. This Note then
analyzes the reasoning behind several Supreme Court decisions that
either uphold or strike down statutes and injunctions that deal with free
speech. Next, this Note focuses on the Court's handling of free speech as
it pertains to the issue of abortion. This Note then analyzes the majority
right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner; and
that preventing the willful obstruction of a person's access to medical counseling
and treatment at a health care facility is a matter of statewide concern. The
general assembly therefore declares that it is appropriate to enact legislation that
prohibits a person from knowingly obstructing another person's entry to or exit
from a health care facility.
(2) A person commits a class 3 misdemeanor if such person knowingly
obstructs, detains, hinders, impedes, or blocks another person's entry to or exit
from a health care facility.
(3) No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of
such person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education,
or counseling with such other person in the public way or sidewalk area within a
radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care facility. Any
person who violates this subsection (3) commits a class 3 misdemeanor.
(4) For the purposes of this section, "health care facility" means any entity
that is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law to
administer medical treatment in this state.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a statutory or home
rule city or county or city and county from adopting a law for the control of
access to health care facilities that is no less restrictive than the provisions of this
section.
(6) In addition to, and not in lieu of, the penalties set forth in this section, a
person who violates the provisions of this section shall be subject to civil liability,
as provided in section 13-21-106.7, C.R.S.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122 (1999).
19. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-106 (1999).
20. Hill, 530 U.S. at 714-15.
21. Id. See generally Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (describing
content neutrality).

22. Hill, 530 U.S. at 730-35.
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and dissenting opinions of Hill v. Colorado, and explains why the
majority's conclusion is flawed. Finally, this Note discusses why the
dissent's rationale is more credible and more likely to preserve the
sanctity of an individual's right to free speech.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH

A. The Importance of Free Speech
Free speech preserves three principal values: (1) advancing knowledge
and "truth" in the "marketplace of ideas," (2) facilitating representative
democracy and self-government, and (3) promoting individual autonomy,
self-expression, and self-fulfillment.23
The first value, advancing
knowledge in the marketplace of ideas, is based on the belief that
suppression of any opinion is wrong, whether or not the opinion is true.24
If a correct opinion is suppressed, society is denied the truth.25 If a false
opinion is suppressed, society is unable to appreciate the full
understanding of the truth because it is denied the ability to see why an
opinion is wrong. 261 Free speech invites dispute,27 and any governmental
23.

GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1025

(13th ed. 1997).
24. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.02 (1994).
25. Id. § 2.02[1] (discussing John Stuart Mill's assertions in his book ON LIBERTY);
see also GUNTHER & SULLIVAN supra note 23, at 1025.
26. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN supra note 23, at 1025. (discussing John Stuart Mill's
libertarian argument). Mill asserted that:
[T]he opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be
true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course, deny its truth; buth they are not
infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and
exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an
opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume certainty is the same
thing as absolute certainty . . . . There is the greatest difference between
presuming an opinion to be true, because with every opportunity for contesting
it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not
permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our
opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes
of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any
rational assurance of being right.
SMOLLA, supra note 24, § 2.02[1] (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, Ch. I1);
see also Cato's Letters (1720), in FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 12, 14 (Sheila Suess Kennedy ed., 1999) (noting that statements, "[w]hen they
are honest, they ought to be publick known, that they may be publickly commended; but if
they be knavish or pernicious, they ought to be publickly exposed, in order to be publickly
detested").
27. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948). The majority stated: "[A]
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed
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action limiting this exchange of ideas chills free expression. Several court
decisions discuss the importance of the marketplace of ideas, 2" and
demonstrate the value of developing a better understanding of the truth.
The Supreme Court emphasized the second principal value, facilitating
29
representative democracy and self-government, in several decisions. In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' for example, Justice Brennan
explained that "a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."'" Free
expression of ideas is an intrinsic part of our political system.32 Broad
debate enables the public to inform and improve the making of
governmental policies.33 Those who do not agree with current public
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging." Id.
28. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(stating that "freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth"); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (finding that "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market and that truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is
the theory of our Constitution").
29. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (discussing the
importance of debate on public issues); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971).
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. Id. at 270; cf. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (stating that "there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs").
32.

See generally FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 12

(Sheila Suess Kennedy ed., 1999). Between 1720 and 1723, John Trenchard and Thomas
Gordon wrote numerous essays on the nature of freedom. Id. at 12. Issued as Cato's
Letters, these essays influenced the debate over England's relationship with the colonies.
Id. One of these essays, "Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same Is Inseparable from
Publick Liberty" addressed the principles that should guide government:
Without Freedom of Thought, there can be no such Thing as Wisdom; and no
such Thing as publick Liberty, without Freedom of Speech: Which is the Right of
every Man, as far as by it he does not hurt and control the Right of another, and
this is the only Check which it ought to suffer, the only Bounds which it ought to
know.
This sacred Privilege is so essential to free Government, that the Security of
Property, and the Freedom of Speech, always go together; and in those wretched
Countries where a Man cannot call his Tongue his own, he can scarce call any
Thing else his own. Whoever would overthrow the Liberty of the Nation, must
begin by subduing the Freedom of Speech; a Thing terrible to publick Traytors.
Cato's Letters, supra note 26.
33. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 53-54, 93-94, 105-07 (1980).
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policy can voice their concerns and disagreements, and thereby
encourage political stability. 4 Political expression must be encouraged
and protected to ensure a fair representation of ideas and values.35
Without this safety valve, individuals would have to find other means,
perhaps through violence, to express their opinions.36
B. The BalancingApproach to ProtectedSpeech
Although speech is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment,
the freedom of speech is not absolute. 7 The Court has found that certain
categories of speech are not protected. For example, in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, the Court found that "fighting words" that inflict injury
or incite a breach of the peace are not protected by the First
Amendment.39
When determining whether a certain type of speech can be proscribed,
the Court balances the First Amendment values inherent in the
communication with the state interest allegedly justifying the
proscription.40 The Court's decision in Cohen v. California41 is perhaps
one of the first manifestations of the Court's balancing approach to free

34. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957). Chief Justice Earl
Warren noted that "[hlistory has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority,
dissident groups, who innumerable times have been the vanguard of democratic thought
and whose programs were ultimately accepted .... The absence of such voices would be a
symptom of grave illness in our society." Id.
35. See generally id. (discussing how free speech prevents government from
entrenching itself indefinitely by keeping clear the channels of political change).
36. In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), Justice Brandeis cautioned in his
concurrence that "[t]hose who won our independence believed that . . . fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government [and] that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies." Id. at 375.
37. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
38. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); see also Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (finding that obscenity is not protected by the First
Amendment). In Chaplinsky, Justice Murphy established that there are certain words "fighting words" - that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. He suggested that such words play
no essential part in the exposition of ideas and have slight social value as a step to the
truth. Id.; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1971) (suggesting that words
that may lead to violence can be regulated). In Cohen, the Court explained that profanity
was at least sometimes protected speech. Id. at 19. The Court recognized that lewd and
profane words may have an emotive function, and may not be proscribed in all cases. Id.
at 26.
39. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
40. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25.
41. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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speech.42 In Cohen, the defendant was arrested and convicted under a
California statute for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the43
Draft" in the corridor outside the Los Angeles County Courthouse.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that the First
Amendment "must be taken to disable the States from punishing public
utterance of this unseemly expletive in order to maintain what they
regard as a suitable level of discourse within the body politic."' 44 The

Court discussed "how the State has no right to cleanse public debate to
it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish
the point where
45
among us."

C. The "Captive Audience"
In Cohen, the Court discussed the degree to which the defendant's
expression intruded into the privacy of an unwilling listener. 6
Specifically, the Court found that to justify the chilling of speech solely to
protect others the government must show that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an intolerable manner.4 7 Any broader view
of this authority would allow a majority to silence dissidents simply due
to a difference of opinion.4 The government may "properly act" to
ensure the privacy of the home and to prohibit the intrusion into the
home of "unwelcome views and ideas., 49 However, the mere presence of
unwilling listeners or viewers in a public setting does not automatically
justify governmental actions curtailing all potentially offensive speech.5°
The Court has compared the right to communicate with the basic right

42. See generally Gerald Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court:
The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1006-1008 (1972) (discussing the
balancing approach in Cohen).
43. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16.
44. Id. at 23.
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id. at 21.
47. Id.
48. Id. This is the type of suppression that John Stuart Mill argued was detrimental

to society. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
49. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22; see also Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397
U.S. 728, 729-30 (1970) (upholding, against a First Amendment challenge a federal law
permitting recipients of a "pandering advertisement," which offered for sale "matter
which the addressee in his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually
provocative," to request a post office order requiring the mailer remove the recipient's
name from the mailing list and cease all future mailings).
50. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22. Justice Harlan reasoned that in the public square,
government may not shield listeners from offensive speech. Id. at 21. Rather, individuals
must simply avert their eyes and ears. Id.
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to be free from unwanted sights, sounds, and tangible matter.5 1 Although
in many circumstances we are part of captive audiences, when inside the
home our individual autonomy allows us to control any unwanted
speech, signs, or other matter." In Rowan v. United States Post Office
Department, Chief Justice Burger reasoned "[t]hat [just because] we are
often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must be

captives everywhere."" Therefore, speech or conduct that intrudes into
the privacy 5of4 the home is not given the full protections of the First
Amendment.
D. Content-Based vs. Content-NeutralRestrictions

The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations
is a crucial one in First Amendment law. Traditionally, content-based
distinctions have been scrutinized more carefully than content-neutral
distinctions. This is because the First Amendment guarantees freedom
to advocate the content of one's ideas. 6 Therefore, it makes sense that a
law that restricts the content of one's ideas is subjected to a higher level
of scrutiny. 7
Viewpoint restrictions are those that prohibit speech or conduct based
on a particular perspective. For instance, in R.A. V. v. St.Paul,58 the Court
51. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736 (explaining that "the right of every person 'to be let
alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate"); see also FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, the issue was a twelve-minute
monologue, broadcast during a mid-afternoon weekday, by George Carlin in which he
discussed the "original" seven dirty words:
"shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker,
motherfucker, and tits." Id. at 751. The Court concluded that the FCC could regulate
materials presented over the airwaves since the materials confront citizens, "not only in
public but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be let alone
plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." Id. at 748.
52. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
53. Id. at 738. See generally Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72
(1983) (stating that "[t]he First Amendment does not permit the government to prohibit
speech as intrusive unless the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech").
However, in Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), the
Court found that consumers in the home may escape exposure to objectionable material
that has been mailed to them simply by transferring the material from the envelope to the
garbage. Id. at 542.
54. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748; Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
55. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
56, Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969); see also supra notes 23-28 and
accompanying text.
57. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972).
58. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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invalidated an ordinance prohibiting symbols that tend to arouse racial
anger or alarm. 9 The majority found that the ordinance was invalid
because it prohibited fighting words by bigots but not those against
them. 60 Therefore, the Court used strict scrutiny and struck down the
ordinance.6'
The Court also strictly scrutinizes regulations that impose restrictions
on subject matter. 6' The ordinance in R.A.V. was also directed at the
subject matter of certain speech.63 Specifically, the ordinance forbade
only words that were "addressed to one of the specified disfavored
topics" of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. 64 These types of
regulations are highly
S61suspect and will only be upheld if they pass the
Court's strict scrutiny.
However, content-neutral laws that aim at a type of expression, but for
reasons unrelated to its content, require a different level of scrutiny. A
form of intermediate scrutiny is used as the standard of review for
content-neutral regulations: government can justify content-neutral
regulations of speech only if it can show that they are closely
66 tailored to
serve a "substantial" or "significant" governmental interest.
59. Id. at 391. The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 380.
60. Id. at 391-92. Justice Scalia stated that: "St. Paul has no [authority] to license one
side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules." Id. at 392.
61. Id. at 395-96.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 391.
64. Id.
65. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1972) (invalidating a Chicago
disorderly conduct ordinance that barred picketing within one hundred and fifty feet of a
school while the school was in session, but exempted peaceful picketing of any school
involved in a labor dispute); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 457, 460-61 (1980)
(finding unconstitutional a state law that generally barred picketing outside residences or
dwellings, but exempted "the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a
labor dispute").
In Mosley, the Court stated that:
[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views .... There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas" and
government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96.
66. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also Ward v. Rock Against
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E. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
It has been established that one may not exercise his or her right to
free speech at any public place and at any time.6' The government has an

interest in maintaining order and control over public streets, parks, and
other fora. 6" Therefore, deference is given to statutes or ordinances that

are content-neutral and serve the significant governmental interest of
maintaining order by imposing time, place, or manner restrictions. 6' For
example, in Heffron v. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness
Inc., the Court validated a Minnesota state fair rule prohibiting the sale
or distribution of any merchandise, including printed or written material,

except from booths rented to all applicants in a nondiscriminatory
manner on a first-come, first-serve basis.7'
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,72 the Court clarified the time, place,

or manner test.73 The Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to
New York City's regulation mandating the use of city-provided sound

systems and technicians to control the volume of concerts in Central
Park.74 The Court's main concern was how strictly to interpret the
"narrowly tailored means" requirement.75 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy announced that a regulation passed the time, place, or manner
regulation was proper if it was "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest.

'76

Justice Kennedy clarified that "[ljest any

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782, 796-98 (1989) (noting that while a content-neutral law must be
closely tailored to its ends, the government need not employ the least restrictive
alternative).
67. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965). The Court found that "a restriction..
• designed to promote the public convenience . . . and not susceptible to abuses of
discriminatory application, cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil
right which, in other circumstances, would be entitled to protection." Id. at 554.
68. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-51
(1981).
69. Id. at 643-44; see also infra note 71 and accompanying text.
70. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
71. Id. at 643-44. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged the
rule because it suppressed a religious ritual that enjoined its members to go into public
places to distribute religious literature. Id.
72. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
73. Id. at 798-99.
74. See id. at 802-03. The Court agreed that the regulation was content-neutral and
because it involved a public forum, New York City's interest in limiting excessive noise
was substantial, and the regulation was proper. Id.
75. Id. at 798-99. In Ward, the Court of Appeals invalidated the regulation because
the city had not shown that it lacked other, less restrictive means of regulating concert
volume. Id. at 798.
76. Id. at 796.
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confusion on the point remain, we affirm today that a regulation of time,
place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve
the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need77
of doing so.
not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means
Applying this deferential standard to the regulation, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the New York City regulation was a "reasonable
regulation of the place and manner of expression" that left ample
alternatives for communication and therefore was proper."'
F. The Intersection of Abortion and the FirstAmendment
Since the legalization of abortion, 9 the Court has struggled with
balancing a woman's right to obtain an abortion and protestors' First
Amendment rights to free speech. 0 The Court has examined protestors'
rights outside of clinics"' as well as their rights in other public fora.' In
Frisby v. Schultz,"3 abortion protestors picketing in front of a doctor's
residence sued town officials because of a city ordinance that banned all
residential picketing. 4 The Court reasoned that public streets are a
traditional public forum that are normally protected by the First
Amendment; however, since the ordinance was content-neutral, the
Court did not apply strict scrutiny." Instead, the Court examined the
77. Id. at 798. Refuting the Court of Appeals rationale, Justice Kennedy stated that
"our cases quite clearly hold that restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech are not invalid 'simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be
less burdensome on speech."' Id. at 797 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675,
689 (1985)).
78. Id. at 803.
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court created the trimester
framework where during the first trimester the state has no compelling interest to
interfere with a woman's decision to have an abortion, during the second trimester the
state has a compelling medical interest in the life of the mother, and during the third
trimester the state has a compelling interest in protecting the fetus. Id. at 163-64. During
the third trimester, the state may "regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of life or health of the
mother." Id. at 165.
80. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc. 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994); Schenck v. ProChoice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 361 (1997).
81. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757.
82. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988) (concerning protestors on a
public street outside of the home of a doctor who performed abortions).
83. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
84. Id. at 476-77. A group ranging from eleven to over forty people, all opposed to
abortions, picketed the residence of a doctor who performed abortions. Id. at 476.
85. Id. at 481-86. The Court stated that public streets are "the archetype of
traditional public forum." Id. at 480. Also, the Court noted that "a public street does not
lose its status as a traditional public forum simply because it runs through a residential
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ordinance to see whether it was narrowly tailored to meet a significant
government interest
and
left ample alternative
means
of
116
communication.
The Court validated the ordinance in Frisby and stressed that the
government had a significant interest in protecting residential privacy
from targeted picketing.87 In addition, because the protestors' aimed
their offensive speech at a captive audience, those inside their homes, the
First Amendment did not protect their speech." Citing Pacifica, Justice
O'Connor stated for the majority that "[t]here simply is no right to force
89
speech into the home of an unwilling listener.
1. Restrictions on Sidewalk Counselors Outside Abortion Clinics
In 1994, the Supreme Court addressed First Amendment concerns in
the abortion context in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.9 The
Court upheld in part and struck down in part a Florida state court
injunction that limited the activities of abortion protestors on public
streets outside an abortion clinic.9' Specifically, the injunction proscribed
protestors from "obstructing or interfering with access to, ingress into
and egress from any building or parking lot of the Clinic;" 92 from
"congregating, picketing, patrolling, [or] demonstrating.., within [thirtysix] feet of the property line;" 93 from making audible sounds or from
displaying "images observable to or within earshot of the patients inside
the Clinic" during certain hours;94 from physically approaching any
person within three hundred feet of the clinic "seeking the services of the
Clinic unless such person indicates a desire to communicate;" 95 from
demonstrating within three hundred feet of, or blocking access to the
residence of any staff member of the Clinic "temporarily or otherwise;" 96
from coming into physical contact with employees, health care
neighborhood." Id.
86. Id. at 482; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-98 (1989).
87. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. The Court noted the unique nature of the home and
recognized that "preserving the sanctity of the home.., is surely an important value." Id.
(quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
88. Id.; see also supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text (discussing the captive
audience doctrine and its relation to the sanctity of the home).
89. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994).
Id.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id. at 760.
Id.
Id.
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professionals, staff members, or patients of the Clinic; 97 and from

''encouraging . . . other persons to commit any of the prohibited acts
9
listed herein."

8

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority," ruled that the
injunction was not content or viewpoint based simply because it
restricted the speech of abortion protestors."' He reasoned that "an
injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group," and
may regulate that group's speech."1 Therefore, the Court found that the
injunction was not invidiously content or viewpoint motivated; rather, it
was issued as a way to stop the protestor's repeated violations of the
lower court's original order. ' ("
The Court announced a new test for evaluating the constitutionality of
content-neutral injunctions."' 3 The Court found that injunctions must
"burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant
government interest.""' The Court rationalized that injunctions deserve
a more rigorous test than the time, place, or manner test used for statutes
because statutes are enacted by the legislature to advance social interests,
while injunctions are directed at those individuals who violate a

97. Id.
98. Id. at 761. (quoting Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d
664, 679-80 (Fla. 1993)).
99. Id. at 757. Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsberg joined in the
Chief Justice's opinion. Id. Justice Stevens joined in parts of the opinion and filed a
separate concurring opinion which concurred in part and dissented in part. id. at 777.
Justice Stevens argued that the Court should have applied a more lenient standard to the
injunction. Id. at 778. Justice Souter filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 776.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 784. Justice Scalia argued that speech
restrictive injunctions should be subjected to the same level of strict scrutiny that is given
to content-based statutes. Id. at 792. Justice Scalia would have found all of the provisions
of the injunction unconstitutional. Id. at 785.
100. Id. at 762-63.
101. Id. at 762.
102. Id. at 763. The Court stated:
[I]n determining content neutrality... [w]e thus look to government's purpose as
the threshold consideration. Here the state court imposed restrictions on
petitioners incidental to their abortion message because they repeatedly violated
the court's original order. That petitioners all share the same viewpoint
regarding abortion does not in itself demonstrate that some invidious content or
viewpoint-based purpose motivated the issuance of the order. It suggests only
that those in the group whose conduct violated the court's order happen to share
the same opinion regarding abortions being performed at the clinic.
Id.
103. Id. at 765.
104. Id.
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legislative or judicial decree."5 Therefore, the Court reasoned that
injunctions "carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory
application...""6
In making its decision, the Court determined that the injunction
addressed several state interests including: protecting women's freedom
to obtain medical services; "ensuring the public safety and order;"
maintaining the "free flow of traffic on public streets and sidewalks;"
protecting property rights; and promoting the medical privacy of patients
in a clinic.0 7 Using the new test, the Court determined whether each
aspect of the Florida injunction burdened more speech than necessary in
accomplishing these interests.'0
The Court upheld the use of the thirty-six foot buffer zone in areas of
clinic property used for access to and from the facility for automobile
traffic, but struck down the zone around all other parts of the clinic
property.' 9 In making this decision, the Court relied on videotape
showing abortion protestors blocking automobile traffic near the clinic
driveway." The Court also upheld the prohibition on protesting audibly
to patients inside the clinic during specified hours to ensure the health
and well-being of clinic patients."' However, the Court struck down the
provision proscribing protests involving "images observable" by patients
in the clinic."2 The Court also struck down the three hundred foot "no
approach" zone."3 The Court found that all uninvited approaches, even
those with a peaceful intent, could not be justified." 4 Finally, the Court
struck down the bar against protesting at the home of employees of the
clinic because the three hundred foot buffer zone was much larger than
115
necessary.
105. Id. at 764.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 767-68.
108. Id. at 768.
109. Id. at 770-71.
110. Id. at 770. The Court concluded: "On balance, we hold that the [thirty-six] foot
buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway burdens no more speech than
necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake." Id.
111. Id. at 772.
112. Id. at 773.
113. Id. at 774-76.
114. Id. at 774. The Court noted that "citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment." Id.
115. Id. at 775. The Court noted that privacy of the home may be protected, but the
size of the buffer zone was much larger than a similar zone which had previously been
found constitutional. Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988) (upholding a town
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Justice Scalia's dissent criticized the creation of a new test for protests
in a traditional public forum.'

6

He pointed out that injunctions are the

product of a single judge, thereby limiting the defenses available to
persons cited for contempt." 7 Therefore, Justice Scalia reasoned that
such injunctions should be subjected to strict scrutiny and found the
injunction in Madsen both content and viewpoint based, and perhaps an

exercise of prior restraint. ' 8 Scalia criticized the new "intermediateintermediate scrutiny" standard the majority set forth." 9 He argued that
the criteria for injunctive relief had not been met in Madsen and was not
demonstrated by the factual findings on record." °

Three years after the Madsen decision, the Supreme Court faced
another injunction concerning restrictions on sidewalk counselors outside22
2
abortion clinics.' ' The protestors in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network

harassed'23 both doctors and patients at abortion clinics. 1 4 In an effort to
prevent further violence, a district court issued a temporary restraining
order establishing a fifteen-foot buffer zone that allowed only two
sidewalk counselors inside.12 A few months later, however, the clinics
and doctors charged that the abortion protestors were in breach of the

ordinance which made it illegal "for any person to engage in picketing before or about the
residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield").
116. Id. at 803 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
117. Id. at 793-94 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
118. Id. at 795-97 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
119. Id. at 794-95 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
120. Id. at 795-97 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
thought that the significant government interest, possible imminent violation of statutory
or common law, and danger of recurrent violation satisfied the criteria for injunctive relief.
Id. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
121. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 361 (1997).
122. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
123. See id. at 362-63. For instance, the protestors frequently used their bodies to
create large-scale blockades that prevented cars from entering the clinic parking lot. Id.
Also, sidewalk counselors yelled at women entering the clinics, attempted to hand out
literature, and discourage them from having an abortion. Id. If the women ignored them,
the counselors yelled and sometimes physically harassed them. Id.
124. Id. Among the plaintiffs in this case were three physicians and four medical
clinics that performed abortions and provided abortion-related services. Id. The
defendants were several abortion protestors and organizations opposed to abortion. Id. at
362. In 1990, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the defendants had violated New York
Civil Rights Law 40-c and New York Executive Law 296, tortiously interfered with
plaintiff's business, trespassed, intentionally inflicted emotional harm on plaintiffs, and
falsely imprisoned plaintiffs. Id. at 362; see also Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue,
799 F. Supp. 1417, 1422 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
125. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 362, 364.
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temporary restraining order.'2 6 A preliminary injunction was then issued
which prohibited protestors from demonstrating within fifteen feet of
persons and vehicles entering or leaving the abortion clinics (floating
bubble zones).'27 The Court also issued a "cease and desist" order that
abortion protestors move fifteen feet away from anyone who indicated a
desire not to talk to them, and a prohibition on demonstrations within
fifteen feet of clinic entrances and driveways (fixed bubble or buffer
zones).'28
Chief Justice Rehnquist, again speaking for the Court, applied the
Madsen test for injunctions.'2 9 The Court struck down the floating fifteen
foot bubble zone because it prevented normal conversations or
handbilling in a moving zone, burdened more speech than necessary to
serve the governmental interests, and created an ambiguous burden for
the protestors. 30 The Court, however, ruled that the state's interest in
public safety and order, free flow of traffic, and protecting individuals
seeking to exercise their rights, justified the fifteen-foot fixed buffer zone
protecting entrances and driveways. 3' The majority emphasized the
"extraordinary" record of violent and illegal conduct when the protestors
came within fifteen feet of the entrances.'32 This prior restraint was
necessary because harassment of the police prevented their prompt
response.'33 The Court
also used this justification to support the "cease
34
and desist" order.'
Although the governmental interest in public safety is a valid interest,
the plaintiffs in Schenck did not plead a claim for threat to public
safety.' 3 The Court reasoned, however, that "the fact that 'threat to
public safety' is not listed anywhere in respondents' complaint as a claim
does not preclude a court from relying on the significant governmental
interest in public safety in assessing petitioners' First Amendment
126.

Id. at 365.

127. Id. at 366-67.
128.

Id. (discussing the details of the order).

129. Id. at 371-85 (noting the similarities to Madsen).
130. Id. at 370-80 (stating the reasons for invalidating the floating bubble zone).
Justice Breyer would have affirmed the floating bubble zone because he read it as not

floating beyond the clinic entrance area. Id. at 395-401 (Breyer, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
131.
132.
because
Id.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 376.
See id at 381-83. The protestors argued that the fixed buffer zone was overbroad
unchallenged parts of the injunction prevented trespass and blocked entrances.
Id. at 381-82.
Id. at 383-85.
Id. at 376.
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'
Therefore, the Court concluded that public safety may be
argument."136
at stake "because of the dangerous situation created by the interaction
and protestors and because of the fights that threatened to
between cars
137

develop.,

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, agreed that the
floating bubble zone was unconstitutional, but disagreed with the Court's
decision to uphold the fixed buffer zone and "cease and desist" orders. 3
Justice Scalia stated that the majority's rationale underlying the
injunction was not that women have a right of access to clinics.'39 Instead,
charged Scalia, the majority erroneously based its ruling on a "right to be
let alone" and a right to be free from exposure to unwanted speech. n
Justice Scalia reiterated that the majority previously held that "there is
no right to be free of unwelcome speech on the public streets while
seeking entrance to or exit from abortion clinics.' 4 ' Therefore, the
dissenters argued that the majority erred in allowing the "right 42to be left
alone" to trump the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.
Justice Scalia also criticized the majority for striking only the most
egregious restraints, yet tolerating the less egregious violations of the
First Amendment. 4 1 Scalia disapproved of the Court's decision to
uphold the "cease and desist" provision on the basis that this provision
constituted "an effort to bend over backwards to 'accommodate'
defendants' speech rights."' 44 The degree to which courts "bend over
backwards" does not nullify their duty to protect the First Amendment .
Finally, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's creation of a claimed
governmental interest to justify the injunction.4 4 Although the district
court specifically found that the protest activities of the defendants were
"usually peaceful in nature,' 4 7 the Court repeatedly stated that the

136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 385-95 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

139. Id. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 386-88 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
142. Id. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776-820 (1994) (outlining the opinions of Justices
Souter, Stevens, and Scalia).
143. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 390 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
144. ld. (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
145. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 392-93.
147. Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1423 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
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defendant's activities threatened public safety.148 The Court created the
governmental interest in public safety to uphold portions of the
injunction. 4 1 Justice Scalia contended that protecting public safety is
within the scope of the executive branch, and the judiciary should not act
independently to protect perceived public interest when public safety is
not the substance of the petitioners' complaint.5 ° Therefore, the Court's
holding was an improper expansion of judicial power."'
II. HILL V. COLORADO: LEGITIMIZATION OF STATUTORY
RESTRICTIONS ON ABORTION PROTESTORS' FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS

Soon after it decided Schenck, the Court considered a challenge to a
Colorado statute making it unlawful for any person to "knowingly
approach" within eight feet of another person, without that person's
consent, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a
sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such
other person within regulated areas. 15 2 Shortly after the passage of the
statute, petitioners, a group of sidewalk counselors,' 3 brought their
lawsuit in the District Court for Jefferson County, Colorado. 5 4 The
petitioners alleged that their sidewalk counseling activities typically
included being within eight feet of other persons and that their fear of
prosecution under the new statute chilled their exercise of fundamental
constitutional rights.'55 Claiming that the statute was facially invalid,
petitioners sought to enjoin its enforcement.'56
The district judge granted the respondents' motion for summary
148. See, e.g., Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376.
149. Id. at 375. See generally Amber M. Pang, Comment, Speech, Conduct, and
Regulation of Abortion Protest by Court Injunction: From Madsen v. Women's Health
Center to Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 34 GONz. L. REV. 201,220-21 (1999).
150. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 392-93 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
151. Id. at 392 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (declaring the
majority's holding as "a wonderful expansion of judicial power").
152.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999).

153. In their complaint and affidavits, petitioners describe themselves as "sidewalk
counsel[ors]" who urge abortion-bound women to consider alternatives to abortion as the
women enter the clinic. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 708 (2000).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 708-09. "It is apparent from the testimony of both supporters and
opponents of the statute that demonstrations in front of abortion clinics impeded access to
those clinics and were often confrontational." Id. at 709. However, the Court noted that
"[tJhere was no evidence.., that the 'sidewalk counseling' conducted by petitioners in this
case was ever abusive or confrontational." Id. at 710.
156. Id.at 708.
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judgment and dismissed the complaint.'
The Colorado Court of
Appeals agreed with the district judge and affirmed the grant of
summary judgment. 58 The Supreme Court of Colorado denied review,
and petitioners sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.'59
While the Hill petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Schenck
v. Pro-Choice Network."" Since the Court held in Schenck that an
injunctive provision creating a speech-free "floating buffer zone" was
unconstitutional, ' the Court vacated the judgment of the Colorado
Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court for further
consideration in light of Schenck.12 On remand the Court of Appeals
again upheld the statute, 63 noting that in Schenck the Supreme Court
"expressly declined to hold that a valid governmental interest in ensuring
ingress and egress to a medical clinic may never be sufficient to justify a
zone of separation between individuals entering and leaving the premises
and protestors."'4 The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 16 In 1999, the Supreme
166
Court granted certiorari.
In a six-three decision delivered by Justice Stevens, the Court affirmed
the Colorado Supreme Court's holding that the statute was consistent
with the First Amendment.16 The Court found that the statute was
content-neutral and a valid time, place, or manner restriction on
speech. 6 1 Moreover, Justice Stevens argued that the common-law "right
to be let alone" is more accurately characterized as an "interest" that

157. Id. at 710. The district judge found that the text of the statute was not viewpoint
based and that the legislative history demonstrated that "the State had not favored one
viewpoint over another." Id. at 711. He concluded that the statute was narrowly tailored
and was not overbroad. Id. Finally, he concluded that the statute was not vague and that
the prior restraint doctrine was inapplicable. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 712.
160. 519 U.S. 357 (1997); see also supra notes 118-47 and accompanying text.
161. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 370-80; see also supra notes 118-47 and accompanying text.
162. Hill v. Colorado, 519 U.S. 1145 (1997).
163. See Hill v. City of Lakewood, 949 P.2d 107, 109 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997), aff d, 973
P.2d 1246 (Colo. 1999), affd 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
164. Hill, 530 U.S. at 712. The Court of Appeals found that even though a fifteen-foot
floating buffer zone might preclude protestors from expressing their views from a normal
conversational distance, a lesser distance of eight feet was sufficient to protect such
speech. Hill, 949 P.2d at 110.
165. Hill, 530 U.S. at 712.
166. Hill, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999), affd, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
167. Hill, 530 U.S. at 705, 714-15.
168. Id. at 719-25.
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69
states can protect in certain situations.
After finding content-neutrality, the Court applied the Ward test and
held that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve the State's significant
governmental interest. 70
In this case, the Court found that the
government's interest outweighed the petitioners' rights to free speech.' 7'
Furthermore, the Court held that the statute was neither
72
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, nor a prior restraint on speech.

In his dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that the
Court's decision was another example of how jurisprudence tends to
change when a case involves abortion. 7 1 Justice Scalia described the
statute
A 1 as an'74 invalid content-based regulation that violated the First
Amendment.
Furthermore, Scalia argued that even if the statute was
content-neutral, it should have been struck down because it "burden[s]
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's
legitimate interests."'
A. The Majority Opinion: FindingStatutory Floating Buffer Zones
Constitutional
In affirming the Colorado Supreme Court's decision, the Court for the
first time held that statutorily-imposed buffer zones around health
care
7
facilities do not violate the principles of the First Amendment.1 1
1. Findingthe Statute is Content Neutral
The Hill Court defined the neutrality of the statute by determining
"whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys."' 7 7 Justice Stevens, speaking
for the majority, found that the statute was not content based because (1)
it is a regulation of where speech may occur, not a regulation of speech
itself; (2) the legislative history and state supreme court's holding show
169. Id. at 716-17. Justice Stevens discussed Justice Brandeis' view that the "right to
be let alone" is "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
170. Hill, 530 U.S. at 725-26.
171. Id. at 718; see also infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
172. Id. at 730-35; see also infra notes 197-208.
173. Id. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 740-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 749 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 799 (1989)).
176. Id. at 714-15. The buffer zones upheld in Schenck and Madsen were imposed by
injunctions, not statewide statutes. See supra notes 118-47 and accompanying text.
177.

Hill, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 51:371

that the restrictions apply equally to all demonstrators, regardless of
viewpoint; and (3) the state's interests in protecting access and privacy,
and providing the police with clear guidelines, are unrelated to the
content of the demonstrators' speech."' The Court rejected the
petitioners' argument that the statute unconstitutionally requires
examination of the content of the speakers' comments. 79 Justice Stevens
stated that it is proper for the Court to examine a statement's content in
order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a particular course of
conduct.' 0 He then distinguished the Colorado statute from the statute
in Carey' 8' and concluded that Colorado imposed a "minor place
restriction on an extremely broad category of communications with
unwilling listeners."' 82 The Court concluded that these restrictions are
content-neutral because they apply to all protest and counseling and to
all demonstrators - whether or not they oppose or support abortion.8
2. The Statute is a Valid Time, Place, or Manner Regulation Under
Ward
Once the Court established that the statute was content-neutral, it
looked to see whether the regulation was "narrowly tailored" to serve
the state's significant governmental interests. " The governmental
interest that the Court recognized was the privacy interest in avoiding
unwanted communications. 18 Specifically, Justice Stevens found that the
common-law "right to be let alone" is more accurately characterized as
178. Id. at 719-20 (discussing the content neutrality of the statute).
179. Id. at 720-24. The petitioners argued that insofar as the statute applies to persons
who "knowingly approach" another within eight feet to engage in "oral protest, education,
or counseling" it is unconstitutionally content based under Carey v. Brown. Id. at 720.
In Carey, the Court examined a prohibition of peaceful picketing that contained an
exemption for picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute. Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980). The Court concluded that the statute violated the
Constitution because it accorded preferential treatment to expression concerning one
particular subject matter while prohibiting discussion of all other issues. Id.
180. Hill, 530 U.S. at 721. In a footnote, Justice Stevens discussed a case where, "after
examining a federal statute that was 'interpreted' . . . as 'prohibit[ing] picketing and
leafleting, but not other expressive conduct' within the Supreme Court building and
grounds," the Court concluded that the prohibition was facially content neutral. Id. at 722
n. 30 (discussing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)).
181. Justice Stevens noted that the Colorado statute applies equally to "used car
salesmen, animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries." Hill,
530 U.S. at 723.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 725.
184. Id. at 725-26.
185. Id.
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an "interest" that states can protect in certain situations."" Justice
Stevens noted that Ward did not require the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of serving the goal."" He found the statute narrowly
tailored to advance governmental interests for several reasons.'88
The three types of speech affected by the statute - display of signs,
leafleting, and oral speech - were not unconstitutionally infringed upon.'8 9
Concerning the signs, the Court rationalized that the eight-foot buffer
zone should not have an adverse impact on the readers' ability to read
what the demonstrators hold up.' 9° Also, although the distance can make
it more difficult for a speaker to be heard, the statute places no limitation
on the number of speakers or the noise level, including the use of
amplification equipment. '9' Justice Stevens suggested that this is the
State's effort to compromise, since Madsen upheld these types of noise
restrictions.'92 Justice Stevens also emphasized that Colorado's floating
buffer zone is less invidious than the zone in Schenck because the eightfoot zone allows the speaker to communicate at a normal conversational
distance. 93
The majority recognized that the burden on leafleting was more
serious than the burdens on oral speech and sign posting since an eightfoot buffer could prevent a leafletter from delivering handbills to some
unwilling recipients. 94 However, the Court found the regulation was
similar to a regulation it upheld in Heffron v. InternationalSociety For
Krishna Consciousness, Inc.'95 and was therefore constitutional.' 96 In
Heffron, the Court emphasized that the First Amendment protects the
186. Id. Justice Stevens relied on Justice Brandeis' words in asserting this state
interest. Justice Brandeis stated that the "right to be let alone" is "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United

States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
187. In Ward, the Court stated that "content-neutral interests.., need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.

781,798 (1989).
188. Hill, 530 U.S. at 724-32.
189. Id. at 726-32.
190. Id. at 726. Justice Stevens suggested that "the separation might actually aid the
pedestrians' ability to see the signs by preventing others from surrounding them and
impeding their view." Id.

191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73 (1994).
See Hill, 530 U.S. at 726-27.
Id. at 727.

195. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). The Court upheld a state fair regulation that required a
religious organization to distribute literature and conduct activity only at booths. Id. at

654-55.
196. Hill, 530 U.S. at 727.
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right of every citizen to have the opportunity to gain the attention of
willing listeners.1 7 Therefore, since the statute only applies to unwilling
listeners, the Court found that it adequately protected the rights of the
leafletters. gs
In addition, the Court justified the burden on all three types of
communication because the eight-foot buffer zone does not affect
demonstrators remaining in place without approaching another person.199
3. The Statue is Not Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad
The Supreme Court also rejected the petitioners' argument that
section 18-9-122(3) is overbroad. 2"0 The Court reasoned that "[t]he fact

that the coverage of a statute is broader than the specific concern ...
is of
no constitutional significance.,

2

'

The Court found that it was of no

significance because the Colorado Legislature made a general policy
choice to scrutinize the statute under the Ward standard, rather than a
stricter standard.0 2 The Court argued that the comprehensive nature of
the statute was a virtue because it evidenced the neutrality of the
201
governmental motive.
The Court also ruled that the petitioners' argument that the statute
was overbroad because it bans all protected expression resulted from a
misreading of the
statute
and an incorrect understanding of the
S•
20420
2 5 Justice Stevens
overbreadth doctrine. Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
explained that the petitioners did not persuade the Court that the impact
of the statute on the conduct of other speakers will differ from its impact
197. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 655 (noting that people may "reach the minds of willing
listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention" (citing Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)).
198. Hill, 530 U.S. at 727.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 730. The petitioners argued that the statute was too broad because it
protected too many people in too many places, rather than just patients at facilities where
confrontational speech had occurred. Id. Also, it burdened all speakers, not just those
who have a history of bad conduct. Id.
201. ld. at 730-31.
202. Id. at 731; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994).
203. Hill, 530 U.S. at 731.
204. Id.
205. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). The overbreadth doctrine enables litigants "to challenge a
statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a
judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." Id. at
612. Moreover, "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe
that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615.
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on their sidewalk counseling. 206 Therefore, since the conduct of other
protestors and counselors at all health care facilities are encompassed
within the statute's legitimate sweep, the statute is not overly broad.
Justice Stevens also stated that section 18-9-122(3) of the Colorado
statute was not unconstitutionally vague.
First, the Court concluded
that the scienter requirement of the statute prevented the statute from
being too vague.0 9 Specifically, the Court asserted that people would
understand what "knowingly" approaching for the purpose of engaging
in oral protest, education, or counseling entails.210 The Court21thus
concluded that "it is clear what the ordinance as a whole prohibits.,
4. Section 18-9-122(3) Does Not Impose a PriorRestraint on Speech
The Court found that the restrictions imposed by the Colorado statute
raise an even lesser prior restraint concern than those in Schenck and
Madsen.212 The Court held that the statute does not provide for a
"heckler's veto" but instead allows all speakers to engage in expressive
activity communicating all viewpoints subject only to the narrow place
requirement found within the "approach" restr2ction.
Furthermore,
the Court stated that prior restraint concerns relate to restrictions
imposed by official censorship, but the Colorado statute only applies if
the pedestrian does not consent to the approach. 214
B. Scalia's Dissent: Discounting the Court's Reasoning
Justice Scalia's dissent charged the majority with setting aside
whatever doctrines of constitutional law that stand in the way of women
obtaining abortions. 2" He conceded that this decision was no surprise
since the Court has characteristically deprived abortion opponents the

206.
207.

Hill, 530 U.S. at 732.
Id.

208. Id. at 732-33. Stevens explained that there are two ways a regulation can be
impermissibly vague: "(1) it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits;" and "(2) it authorizes or encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id.; see also Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,
56-57 (1999).
209. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 733 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,110 (1972)).
212.

See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.

In Schenck and Madsen,

particular speakers were at times completely banned within certain zones.
213. Hill, 530 U.S. at 734.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ability to persuade women contemplating abortion that such activity is
216
wrong.
1. The Statute is Undeniably Content Based
Justice Scalia argued that the statute is content-based since a speaker
who approaches another for the purpose of communicating any message
except one of protest, education, or counseling, may do so without
violating the statute. 2" Therefore, whether or not a speaker violates the
law depends
entirely on what he or she intends to say to the other
218
person.
The content of the speech is determinative. Justice Scalia
questioned the majority's reasoning that "oral protest, education, or
counseling" are likely to present the problem of "harassment, . . .
nuisance, .... persistent importuning, ... following,... dogging, and...
implied threat of physical touching., 21 9 Scalia conceded that oral protest
may run these risks; however, he found it unlikely that education and
2211
counseling would produce such conduct.
Scalia then asserted that the words of the statute - "oral protest,"
"education," and "counseling" - are used to give the impression of
content neutrality. 21 In reality, however, these words are used to hide
the true purpose of the statute, which is to prevent protestors from
dissuading women from abortion. 222 Justice Scalia charged that the true
purpose of the Colorado Legislature was evidenced in the wording of the
statute itself: the "right to protest or counsel against certain medical
procedures" around health care facilities.223 Scalia explains that one type
of speech was the target of the legislation.
Justice Scalia then discussed the Court's willingness to examine the
content of a communication to determine whether it "constitutes a
threat, blackmail, an agreement to fix prices, a copyright violation, a
public offering of securities, or an offer to sell goods., 225 Speech of
certain content may be constitutionally banned; however, the Court has
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 741-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 743 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia said that "Socrates was something of a

noodge, but even he did not go that far." Id.
221. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the language of COL. REV. STAT. § 18-9-

122(1) (1999)).
224. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 746 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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never taken the step of relegating "protest, education, and counseling" to
the category of constitutionally proscribed speech.226 Justice Scalia
concluded that the statute was a content-based restriction upon speech in
a public forum; therefore it must pass strict scrutiny and be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.227
2. Even if Content-Neutral,the Statute Does Not Pass the Time, Place,
or Manner Test

Justice Scalia criticized the majority for its confusion as to what was
truly Colorado's asserted interest in passing the legislation.2 Colorado
identified in the text of the statute the interest it sought to advance: to
ensure that citizens may "obtain medical counseling and treatment in an
unobstructed manner" by "preventing the willful obstruction of a

person's access to medical counseling and treatment at a health care
facility.,

229

The Court, on the other hand, concluded that the restriction

is narrowly tailored to serve "the State's interest
in protecting its citizens'
23 0
rights to be let alone from unwanted speech.,

Justice Scalia noted that not only was the Court's asserted interest
completely different from the State's declared interest, but the state
23
explicitly disclaimed the interest to be let alone as a "straw interest.,
Therefore, the Court justified a statute by relying on a governmental

interest that was "not only unasserted by the State," but was positively
rejected.232

Scalia
then discredited the governmental interest that the Court
•
.233
invented.
He observed that the "right to be let alone" that Justice
Brandeis enunciated in Olmstead was a right to be let alone by the

226. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. See id. at 748. Justice Scalia then analyzed the statute under the strict scrutiny
standard and found that the government interest (protecting people from unwilling
communications) is not a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 748-49. Also,
forbidding peaceful, non-threatening, but uninvited speech from a distance closer than
eight feet is not narrowly tailored. Id. at 749. Scalia stated that if the statute were
narrowly tailored the "narrow tailoring must refer not to the standards of Versace, but to
those of Omar the tentmaker." Id.
228. Id. at 749-50 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
229. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (1999); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 749-50 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (noting that the respondents briefs reiterated the asserted state interest).
230. See 530 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted); see also supra notes
185-86 and accompanying text.
231. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Brief for Respondents 15 at 25 n.19).
232. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 751 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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234
government;
and not an "interest to be free from hearing unwanted
opinions of one's fellow citizens.,1 35 Furthermore, Scalia noted that as
recently as the Schenck opinion, the Court indicated that in public debate

"citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to

provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment., 236 Therefore, according to precedent, only when speech

intrudes into the privacy of the home can such offensive messages be
restricted. 237 Consequently, Justice Scalia concluded that by upholding
the statute, the Court essentially raised the protection given to an
abortion clinic to that given a home.238
3. The Ward Test Applied to Colorado'sTrue Interest
Scalia then scrutinized2 39 the statute under the true state interest
asserted in Colorado's brief: unhindered access to healthcare facilities.240
He argued this interest does not justify the substantial burdens that the
statute imposes on the right to speak and pass handbills.14 The law
effectively dissolves the type of personal counseling that some protestors
engage in outside clinics. 2
Also, by forbidding leafletters from
234. Id. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
235. Hill, 530 U.S. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997).
237. See supra notes 45-53 (discussing the captive audience doctrine).
238. Hill, 530 U.S. at 752-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239. Scalia focused on the narrow tailoring requirement. Id. at 754-55. He argued that
the majority's decision effectively created a new definition of "narrowly tailored." Id. at
755-56. Scalia asserted that the Court's new test suggests that the availability of
alternative means of communication allows more types of communication, by more
individuals, to be proscribed. Id. at 756. This relaxed standard does not fit within the
"narrowly tailored" framework. Id.
240. Id. at 754 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 757-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the burdens that the statute
imposes on protestors ability to speak and pass handbills).
242. Id. at 757 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In an outdoor environment the type of sensitive
counseling and educating that is likely to take place outside of a clinic cannot be done by
yelling to someone from an eight foot distance. Id. Scalia observed that:
The availability of a powerful amplification system will be of little help to the
woman who hopes to forge, in the last moments before another of her sex is to
have an abortion, a bond of concern and intimacy that might enable her to
persuade the woman to change her mind and heart. The counselor may wish to
walk alongside and to say, sympathetically and as softly as the circumstances
allow, something like: "My dear, I know what you are going through. I've been
through it myself. You're not alone and you do not have to do this. There are
other alternatives. Will you let me help you? May I show you a picture of what
your child looks like at this stage of her human development?" The Court would
have us believe that this can be done effectively - yea, perhaps even more
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approaching women within eight feet, the Court completely renders the
241
practice of handbilling ineffective.
The broad prophylactic restrictions imposed by the Colorado statute,
argued Scalia, are not sufficiently connected to the evil the regulation
sought to eliminate.244 Scalia compared the Colorado statute to the
regulation the Court struck down in United States v. Grace.245 In Grace,
the valid interest in security could not justify a broad ban on certain

2ourt.6
expressive activity on the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme
Scalia argued that the Colorado statute is similar to the ban in Grace
because it lacks precision and a sufficient nexus."'
Under First Amendment doctrine, the proper inquiry is whether the
regulation in question burdens more speech than necessary to achieve
the particularinterest the government has identified.249 Scalia contended
requisite precision and the Court
that in this case, the statute lacked the
249
result.
a
as
it
invalidated
have
should
The Schenck and Madsen decisions offer no support for the majority's
approval of the prophylactic measure taken by the Colorado
In Schenck, the Court upheld the injunction because the
Legislature."
defendants' past conduct demonstrated that they would, if permitted

effectively - by shouting through a bullhorn at a distance of eight feet.
Id.
243. Id. at 757 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Handbilling is a "classic form[] of speech that
lie[s] at the heart of the First Amendment." Schenck v. Pro Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357,
377 (1997). The practice of passing handbills requires the handbiller to walk a few steps
toward individuals passing in the vicinity. Hill, 530 U.S. at 758. By extending his arm, the
handbiller makes it as easy as possible for the passerby to accept the offering. Id. Since
few pedestrians are likely to give their consent to a handbiller's approach, the practice has
been constructively extinguished. Id.
244. Hill, 530 U.S. at 758-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Unlike other cases where the
Court upheld content-neutral, time, place and manner restrictions on expression, the
Colorado statute, argued Scalia, lacked a sufficient nexus between the regulated
expression and the evil sought to be eliminated. Id. at 758. In Ward, the regulation of
sound amplification was upheld because every occasion of amplified sound could disturb
the areas surrounding the public forum. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795
(1998). Instead of banning all concerts, the regulation focused on the "source of the evils
the city [sought] to eliminate ... and eliminate[d] them without at the same time banning
or significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech that does not create the same
evils." Id. at 799 n.7.
245. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
246. Id. at 181-82.
247. Hill, 530 U.S. at 759 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 760 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
249. Id. at 759 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 761-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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within the buffer zone, continue to impede the free flow of traffic. 5'
Similarly, in Madsen, the Court concluded that "[a]bsent evidence that
the protesters' speech is independently proscribable (i.e. 'fighting words'
or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from
a threat of physical harm," restrictions on their speech cannot stand.252
Scalia argued that the First Amendment was intended to protect people
from prophylactic legislation such as the Colorado statute.253
Individuals whose objective it is to frighten women or doctors will not
be deterred by the Colorado statute; they can still scream and use
amplification systems from eight feet away. 254 In reality, the only people
who will be deterred by the statute are those who would achieve their
stated objectives by peaceful means."' In addition, Justice Scalia
maintained that the Court's decision added the First Amendment
doctrines of narrow tailoring and overbreadth to the list of fatalities
caused by the Court's pro-abortion jurisprudence . 2566 Justice Scalia was
not surprised, however, because the Court characteristically goes out of
its way to justify pro-abortion measures."'
251. Id. at 761 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519
U.S. 357, 382 (1997) (stating that the defendants would "continue to do what they had
done before: aggressively follow and crowd individuals right up to the clinic door and then
refuse to move, or purposefully mill around parking lot entrances in an effort to impede or
block the progress of cars").
252. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994).
253. Hill, 530 U.S. 761-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia quoted NAACP v. Button,
which said that "[bIroad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect ....
Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most
precious freedoms." Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963)).
254. Id. at 763 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 762 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 764 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia compared the Hill decision with Stenberg
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), which the Court decided on the same day. Scalia noted
that the Court used contradictory rationales in the two cases to achieve the same goal:
unequivocal support of abortion. Hill, 530 U.S. at 764. Scalia noted:
The present case disregards the State's own assertion of the purpose of its
proabortion law, and posits instead a purpose that the Court believes will be
more likely to render the law constitutional. Stenberg rejects the State's assertion
of the very meaning of its antiabortion law, and declares instead a meaning that
will render the law unconstitutional. The present case rejects overbreadth
challenges to a proabortion law that regulates speech, on grounds that have no
support in our prior jurisprudence and that instead amount to a total repudiation
of the doctrine of overbreadth. Stenberg applies overbreadth analysis to an
antiabortion law that has nothing to do with speech, even though until eight years
ago overbreadth was unquestionably the exclusive preserve of the First
Amendment.
Id.; see also Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 954; Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S JUDICIAL MANEUVERS TO SILENCE THE
ANTI-ABORTION MESSAGE

The majority's reasoning in Hill is flawed for many reasons and
exemplifies the Court's willingness to silence moral debate when it
concerns opposition to abortion.258 The Court first erred in finding the
statute content-neutral.259 The words of the statute indicate that the
restriction was aimed exclusively at those who protest against abortion.26 °
Since its stated purpose is to restrict a certain type of speech, the statute
is not content-neutral.2 6' Abortion protestors' dissidence inspired the
statute and it manifests the Colorado Legislature's desire to silence the
protestors' message.262 Had the statute concerned subject matter other
than abortion, the Court might have followed its First Amendment
jurisprudence and strictly scrutinized it as a content-based regulation."'
After erroneously finding the statute content-neutral, the Court
interest in
invented •a state
S an attempt to satisfy the narrow tailoring
264
As Justice Scalia stated in his dissent, the interest created
requirement.
by the Court - the right "to be let alone"- was not only different from the
interest
b. 265 that the statute set forth, it was also disclaimed by the State in its

brief.

In addition, as recently as 1997, the Court refused to rely on any

Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1177-1181 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting on denial of certiorari); Ada
v. Guam Soc. Of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1013 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting of denial of certiorari).
258. See supra section II; see generally SMOLLA supra note 24, § 2.02 (discussing the
importance of allowing the free flow of ideas); Ellis & Wu, supra note 11, at 583; Wardle,
supra note 15, at 957-61; Youmans, supra note 11, at 632-33.
259. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
260. COLO REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (2000) (stating that "the exercise of a person's
right to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures must be balanced against
another person's right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed
manner) (emphasis added).
261. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text (discussing content neutrality).
262. The Colorado statute is similar to the statute strictly scrutinized in R.A.V. v. St.
Paul. Although not as explicit as the statute in R.A.V., the Colorado statute is clearly
addressed to one disfavored topic. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (2000) (noting
that the restriction applies to the "right to protest or counsel against certain medical
procedures") (emphasis added).
263. Outside of the abortion context, the Supreme Court has been quick to recognize
regulations that are content-based. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96
(1992) (striking down a St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance); Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 n.2 (1972) (invalidating a Chicago disorderly conduct ordinance
that barred picketing within one hundred and fifty feet of a school while the school was in
session, but exempted "peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute").
264. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715-17 (2000).
dissenting). Scalia asserted that Colorado was correct in
265. Id. at 750 (Scalia, J.,
refusing to recognize the right "to be let alone" as a legitimate interest because the
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supposed "right of the people approaching and entering the [abortion]
facilities to be left alone. 2 66 The Court's exaltation of this interest is
1267
unsupported and has been explicitly declared invalid.
Furthermore, permitting states to proscribe "education" and
"counseling" creates a slippery and terrifying slope.2 Banning such
6
speech is invidious to the very principles behind the First Amendment.1 1
The vague and overbroad language of the statute is problematic when
one considers the ramifications of banning peaceful conduct such as
education and counseling. 71 The majority
tried to
•
271
~ curei this problem by
suggesting that the scienter requirement "makes itclear what the
ordinance as a whole prohibits. 272 Without explicitly saying so, the
majority conceded that the sole target of the statute is the speech of
abortion protestors. 273 As such, the statute is blatantly viewpoint-based
274
Instead of
and should have been invalidated without further review.
Supreme Court had previously refused to recognize it. Id.
266. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997). The Court doubted
that the right to be let alone "accurately reflects our First Amendment jurisprudence." Id.
The Court derived the "right to be let alone" from Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). However, the right that Justice Brandies
identified was a right "conferred, as against the government," not a generalized right to be
free from hearing opinions of one's fellow citizens. Id.
267. See supra note 266.
268. Section 18-9-122 punishes those who approach for the purpose of "education" or
"counseling." COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (2000).
269. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. i; see also Of
Freedom of Speech, supra note 32, at 16 (stating that "[f]reedom of Speech, therefore,
being of such infinite Importance to the Preservation of Liberty, everyone who loves
Liberty ought to encourage Freedom of Speech...").
270. See generally Wardle, supra note 15, 915-39 (discussing the hurdles aboltionists
had to overcome and analogizing their plight to that of modern day abortion protestors).
The petitioners also contended that the word "approaching" was unconstitutionally
vague. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732. Specifically, the petitioners questioned whether certain
physical movements such as an outstretched arm constitutes "approaching." Id.
271. Section 18-9-122(3) applies to a person who "knowingly" approaches another
within eight feet, without that person's consent, for the purpose of engaging in oral
protest, education, or counseling. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3)
272. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732-33 (internal quotations omitted). Justice Stevens further
contended that "[tihe likelihood that anyone would not understand any of those common
words seems quite remote." Id. at 732.
273. Id. at 743 n.I (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "'education' and 'counseling' are
code words for efforts to dissuade women from abortion - in which event the statute would
not be viewpoint neutral, which the Court concedes makes it invalid").
274. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Madsen Court stated that "[t]he vice of contentbased legislation -- what renders it deserving of the high standard of strict scrutiny -- is not

that it is always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use
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formally acknowledging the invidious content-based nature of the
statute, the majority avoided the issue by suggesting that it is unlikely
275
that "anyone would not understand any of those common words.,
The majority also distorted the captive audience doctrine. 276 The

Court's willingness to distort the doctrine in the abortion context is clear
when one compares the Court's analysis of the Colorado statute to other
regulations examined in the past. 21

In Frisby, the Court upheld a

content-neutral ordinance prohibiting picketing outside of a home
because it was narrowly tailored and justified by the government's

interest in protecting residential privacy. 2" The linchpin of the Court's
279
decision was that the ordinance protected intrusion into the home.
Outside the sanctuary of the home, however, people may be subjected to

objectionable speech.

This was shown in Grace, where the Court

declined to uphold a ban on certain expressive activity outside of the
Supreme Court. 2 '
Although the Court refused to uphold speech
for those purposes." Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 794 (1994).
Scalia refuted the majority's contention that the Colorado statute poses no threat to
First Amendment freedoms because it applied to used car salesmen, animal rights
activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries by comparing it to Anatole
France's reflection that "the law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the
poor to sleep under bridges ....
Hill, 530 U.S. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting J.
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 550 (16th ed. 1992)). Scalia contended that "[tihis
Colorado law is no more targeted at used car salesmen, animal rights activists, fund
raisers, environmentalists, and missionaries than French vagrancy law was targeted at the
rich." Id.
275. Id. at 732.
276. See supra § I1A (discussing the majority's reasoning).
277. See, e.g. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988) (examining an ordinance that
made it "unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about [a] residence");
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1983) (looking at a statute that prohibited
displays in front of the Supreme Court); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397
U.S. 728, 729 (1970) (examining Title Ill of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of
1967).
278. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
279. Id.
280. Id. "Outside the home, the burden is generally on the observer or listener to
avert his eyes or plug his ears against the verbal assaults, lurid advertisements, tawdry
books and magazines, and other 'offensive' intrusions which increasingly attend urban
life." LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19 (2d ed. 1988).
281. Grace, 461 U.S. at 181. The provision at issue in Grace was part of a 1949
statutory scheme intended to protect the Supreme Court grounds. Id. at 173 n.1. The
statute provided:
It shall be unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in
the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or
device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or
movement.
Id.
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restrictions outside of the Supreme Court, it infringed on the First
Amendment rights of people outside of abortion clinics."' Therefore, by
upholding the Colorado statute, the Court elevated abortion clinics to
the status of the home.283
The Hill decision is a significant departure from Madsen and Schenck
because it is the first time the Court has upheld a statute with a floating
buffer zone outside of health care facilities.284 States may now enact
legislation such as the Colorado statute and bypass injunctions of the
type examined in Madsen and Schenck.
With each decision concerning
abortion protestors' First Amendment rights, the Court allows more and
more governmental infringement."" As long as states draft their proabortion legislation in a manner explicitly revealing their invidious
purposes, the Court will continue to uphold statutes that infringe on
protestors' constitutional right to free speech.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the past ten years the Court has increasingly infringed on the rights
of abortion protestors. The Court has continuously restricted more and
more of the constitutionally protected rights of protestors. The Hill
decision opened the door to state, and perhaps federal, legislation
infringing on individuals' Constitutional rights. Unfortunately, the
Court's judicial maneuvering ensures that only the message of abortion
protestors will be silenced.

282.

Compare id. at 181, with Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).

283. Hill, 530 U.S. at 759-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court does not
suggest that a pedestrian is a "captive" of a speaker seeking to address him on the public
sidewalks). But see id. at 718 (suggesting that "the degree of captivity makes it impractical
for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure").
284. See generally Ellis & Wu, supra note 11; Youmans, supra note 11.

285. A statewide statute will enable courts to impose criminal sanctions immediately,
thereby trumping the use of an injunction. Hill, 530 U.S. at 761-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
286. It is evident from the holdings in Madsen, Schenck, and Hill that the Court has
increasingly infringed on the First Amendment freedoms of abortion protestors.

